It also nicely demonstrates how traditional 'module-replacing' updating can safely co-exist with in-memory micropatching. This is a welcome automatic side effect of in-memory patching, unburdening users from doing anything beyond applying the official vendor update once it becomes available. 5 and of course its cryptographic hash also changed - which resulted in our micropatch for this issue no longer getting applied to msrd3x40.dll. The version of msrd3x40.dll changed from.

As expected, the update brought a modified msrd3x40.dll binary: this is the binary with the vulnerability, which we had micropatched with 4 CPU instructions (one of which was just for reporting purposes). Now, a few days ago, Microsoft issued their fix for this issue as part their October 2018 Monthly Update. For more details up to that point see our previous blog post. We at 0patch took ZDI's proof-of-concept exploit and created a free micropatch for our users just 24 hours later. The story begins with the ZDI reporting a memory corruption vulnerability in Jet Database Engine (subsequently assigned CVE-2018-8423) to Microsoft, which then led to a public 0day drop 135 days later without Microsoft having issued an official fix for it.

not how we are smarter than Microsoft (we really aren't) but how micropatching is a much more suitable technology for fixing vulnerabilities on billions of computers than the current de-facto standard of what we call 'fat updates'. Confused? It's actually a nice case study to demonstrate. This is a story about a Windows vulnerability that was reported to Microsoft, published as '0day' before the official patch was available, micropatched by us one day later, subsequently patched by Microsoft, found to be incorrectly patched, and now micropatched again over the flawed official patch.

What is foxit reader update 9 2018